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Abstract
Agriculture’s share of economic activity is known to vary inversely with a country’s level of
development. This paper examines whether extensions of the neoclassical growth model can account
for some important sectoral patterns observed in a current cross section of countries and in the time
series data for currently rich countries. We ﬁnd that a straightforward agricultural extension of the
neoclassical growth model fails to account for important aspects of the cross-country data. We then
introduce a version of the growth model with home production, and weshow that thismodel performs
much better.
 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Economists have long recognized that agriculture’s share of economic activity varies
inversely with the level of output. This is true both across countries and over time
within a given country. Development economists have traditionally viewed the process
of structural transformation—including the relative decline of the agricultural sector—as
an important feature of the development process.1 In contrast, modern growth theorists
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1 The relevant literature from development economics on structural change is too large to summarize, but key
works dealing with the role of agriculture in the process of economic growth include: Johnston and Mellor (1961),
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have tended to abstract from sectoral issues in their examination of international income
differences. A major branch of recent research in this area uses one-sector versions of the
neoclassical growth model to examine the impact of various policy distortions on steady-
state income levels. (Examples include: Chari et al., 1996; Parente and Prescott, 1994;
Prescott, 1998; and Restuccia and Urrutia, 2001.) A general ﬁnding of this research is
that such models can plausibly account for the huge observed disparity in international
incomes provided that the combined share of tangible and intangible capital in income is
around two-thirds.
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether such models can also account for the
sectoral patterns present in both the cross section of countries and the time series of the
currently rich countries. To accomplish this we consider an extension of the neoclassical
growth model to include an agricultural sector and assess the quantitative implications
of the theory for both aggregate and sectoral patterns. We believe that this provides
an additional check on these theories while also offering a careful investigation of the
claim—centralto traditionaldevelopmenteconomics—thatsectoral differencesare critical
to understanding international income disparities.
Our analysis begins with a straightforward extension of the neoclassical growth
model to include an agricultural sector. Following the literature, we then consider policy
differencesacrosscountriesthatservetoincrease thecostofcapital. We ﬁnd thatthemodel
fails to replicate a key feature of the data ﬁrst documented by Kuznets (1971) for a small
set of countries and here for a larger set, namely, the enormous cross-country disparity
in relative productivities of agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. This failure exists
whether we consider distortions that affect the agriculture and non-agriculture sectors
equally or unequally.
This failure leads us to follow Parente et al. (2000) and extend the standard growth
model to incorporate Becker’s model of home production. We deviate from Parente et al.
by incorporatingspatial heterogeneityinto our modelso that home productionpossibilities
differ between rural and urban regions. As in Parente et al., distortions that discourage
capital accumulationmove resourcesout of market activity and into householdproduction.
In our model, however, there is an additional effect. Namely, these distortions induce
people to stay in the rural area, where they devote much of their time to home production
relative to the urban area. As a result, marketed agricultural output per worker is lower
in distorted (poor) economies than in undistorted (rich) economies. To assess our theory
we restrict the model’s parameters to roughly match the US observations over the 1870–
1990 period and then explore the consequences of policy differences for cross country
differences in income, sectoral compositions, and sectoral productivity. We ﬁnd that the
home production model can account for most of the sectoral differences observed across
countries as well as the secular changes in the United States over the 1870–1990 period.
Fei and Ranis (1964), Schultz (1964), Lewis (1955), Kuznets (1966), Chenery and Syrquin (1975), Johnston and
Kilby (1975), Hayami and Ruttan (1985), Mellor (1986), Timmer (1988), and Syrquin (1988). A key debate in
this literature is whether agriculture diminishes in importance because it has low inherent potential for growth
(e.g., Fei and Ranis, 1964; Lewis, 1955) or because agricultural growth in some way stimulates non-agricultural
sectors of the economy (e.g., Mellor, 1986).D. Gollin et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 827–850 829
As with the home production story told by Parente et al. (2000),our model predicts that
measuredoutputdifferencesoverstatetruedifferences.Forthisreason,wecomparewelfare
betweendistortedandundistortedeconomies.Despitetherebeingmoreunmeasuredoutput
in the distorted economy, the welfare difference between rich and poor countries is still
large.
We certainly are not the ﬁrst to extend the neoclassical growth model to include
an agricultural sector. An early literature dating to Uzawa (1961, 1963), Takayama
(1963) and Inada (1963) explored two-sector growth models that could reasonably be
interpreted as representing an agricultural sector and a non-agricultural sector. More
recently, Echevarria (1995, 1997) and Kongsamut et al. (1997) have examined the secular
decline in agriculture’s importance in the currently rich, industrialized nations. These
papers have not, however, sought to explain the current cross-country differences in
agriculture’s share of economic activity. In these papers, only initial capital stocks differ
across countries, so that all the cross-sectional observations correspond to different points
along the same equilibrium path. As we document, this view is inconsistent with the data.
There are a number of other dynamic general equilibrium models that likewise include
an agriculturalsector. Glomm(1992),Matsuyama (1992),and GoodfriendandMcDermott
(1995) all take an endogenous growth approach. Laitner (2000) focuses on differences in
savingspatternsacrosscountries.HismodelconformstoEngels’sLaw,butthedynamicsof
his model are such that there are extended time periods during which only the agricultural
sector is operating. Caselli and Coleman (2001) focus on a ﬁxed cost associated with the
acquisition of human capital in order to accountfor the secular decline of agriculturein the
United States and the associated convergence in incomes between northern and southern
states.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents the current sectoral differences
across countries and within countries across points in time. Section 3, by way of
background, reviews the standard neoclassical growth model. Section 4 analyzes the
standard neoclassical growth model extended to include an agriculture sector. Section 5
analyzesthe homeproductionextensionof thismodelwith an agriculturalsector. Section 6
concludes the paper.
2. Some development facts
Thissectiondocumentssomekeysectoralaspectsofthedevelopmentprocess.We begin
with two well-known facts. The ﬁrst is that in a cross section of countries, the agricultural
sector is relatively larger in poorer countries, whether measured in terms of outputs or
inputs. Figure 1 plots agriculture’s share of GDP against real GDP per capita, using 1990
data from the World Bank’s Social Indicators of Development and Penn World Tables
(PWT 5.6), while Fig. 2 plots agriculture’s share of total employment against real GDP
per capita, using 1990 data from the United Nations Human Development Report 1997
and PWT 5.6.2 The slope of the trend line ﬁt through the scatter plot in Fig. 1 is −0.094
2 The World Bank’s Social Indicators of Development report agriculture’s share of GDP in 1990 for 150
countries in the world. For six more countries, we were able to obtain data on agriculture’s share from the 1997830 D. Gollin et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 827–850
Fig. 1. Fraction of GPD in agriculture, 1990 cross section.
Fig. 2. Employment in agriculture as fraction of workforce, 1990 cross section.
while the slope of the trend line ﬁt through the scatter plot in Fig. 2 is −0.20. The poorest
countries have as much as 50 percent of GDP comprised of agriculture and as much as 70
United Nations Human Development Report, and for the United States we used data from the 1997 Economic
Report to the President. We then used all of these countries for which 1990 data on real per capita GDP were
available in the Penn World Tables v. 5.6, leaving us with a total of 102 countries.D. Gollin et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 827–850 831
Fig. 3. Employment in agriculture as fraction of workforce, time series data for 15 industrial countries.
Fig. 4. Agriculture share of GDP, time series data for 15 industrial countries.
percent of employment in this activity. In the rich countries, these two shares are less than
10 percent of the totals.
The second well-documented fact is from time series data: the relative size of the
agriculture sector both in terms of output and employment declines as an economy
develops. This is documented in Figs. 3 and 4 using pooled time series data going back832 D. Gollin et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 827–850
Fig. 5. Relative productivity in non-agriculture, by real per capita GDP, 1990 cross section data.
over two centuries for a set of 15 currently rich countries. In these ﬁgures the output and
employment shares are plotted against each country’s per capita GDP relative to the 1985
US level.3 Looking at Fig. 4, for example, agriculture’s share of total employment was
about 50 percent in France in the mid 19th century, and about 50 percent in Italy as late as
1920. During the 20th century, however, these employment shares fell dramatically so that
in 1990 they stood at no more than 10 percent in any currently rich country and as little as
2 percent in some countries.
The third fact is not as well known, though it is documented in Kuznets (1971) for a
smaller set of countries and an earlier time period. Using the data on agriculture’s share of
GDP and employment, we compute a measure of output per worker in non-agriculture
relative to agriculture. Figure 5 displays these relative productivity differences plotted
against real GDP per capita for each of the countries in our sample. A striking pattern
emerges—non-agricultural productivity in poor countries is far higher than agricultural
productivity, often by a factor of 10 or more. By contrast, in the rich countries this ratio is
typically less than 2. A regression of relative productivity of non-agricultureto agriculture
on a constant and log of real GDP per capita yields a slope of −1.9.
It is important to note that these productivity measures are based on domestic relative
prices. A number of studies have attempted to determine the extent to which differencesin
3 Data on employment shares and GDP shares in agriculture are taken from Mitchell (1992, pp. 912–917),
Kurian (1994, pp. 93–94), Mitchell (1993, pp. 775–777), and Mitchell (1995, pp. 1027–1031). Data on real per
capita GDP are taken from Penn World Tables, v. 5.6, for the available years of coverage; historical data are taken
from Maddison (1995, pp. 194–206).D. Gollin et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 827–850 833
domestic relative prices explain these relative productivity differences. One set of studies,
including Rao (1993) and Hayami and Ruttan (1985), ﬁnds the differences in relative
productivities to be at least as large when PPP comparisons are made.4 Another set of
studies, including Kuznets (1971), Krueger et al. (1992), Schiff and Valdés (1992), and
Bautista and Valdés (1993), ﬁnds these differences in relative productivities to be smaller
on account of agricultural products being systematically under priced in poor countries by
as much40–50percent.Whicheverview we take of relative prices, it is clear that the cross-
country differences in relative productivity are at least as large as differences in measured
per capita output.
This striking difference between today’s rich and poor countries leads us to examine
the time series data to see whether such large relative productivity differences existed in
the rich countries a century or so ago when they were as poor as today’s poor countries.
Although we do not have time series data for currently rich countries that covers the
range of GDP per capita in the cross section, the available data suggests that relative
productivity differences in the time series for individual countries are signiﬁcantly smaller
than differencesin the 1990cross section. Figure 6 plots the time series data for the United
States, United Kingdom, and Canada, along with the 1990 cross section data on relative
sectoralproductivityagainstGDPpercapita.5 FortheUnitedKingdomandCanadarelative
productivity has been nearly constant over time and close to one. This is essentially the
case for almost all the currently rich countries. The one exception is the United States,
which experienced a fairly large drop in this ratio between 1870 and 1900 from 4.3 to 2,
but thereafter maintained a more or less constant ratio of 2.6 As the ﬁgure clearly shows,
a large numberof today’spoor countries are far away from the path followed in the past by
today’s rich countries. A similar ﬁnding appears in Kuznets (1971) for a smaller sample of
countries.
The data analysis leads to several obvious questions. Why are relative productivity
differences in today’s poor countries so much larger than was the case for today’s rich
countries a century ago, when they had comparable incomes? Why are agricultural
workers in the poorest countries apparently so unproductive?And why is there not greater
4 The Prasada Rao PPP-adjusted data (pp. 135–136, Table 7.3) show that agricultural output per worker in
the highest-productivity country (New Zealand) is greater than the comparable ﬁgure for the lowest-productivity
country (Mozambique) by a factor of 244. The ratio of average productivity in the ﬁve highest productivity
countries to the average productivity in the ﬁve lowest is 139.3! Hayami and Ruttan (1985) also ﬁnd differences
in agricultural output per worker based on PPP measurements to be at least as large than differences in aggregate
output per worker. In the 1960 cross section they ﬁnd factor differences in agricultural output per worker between
the top ﬁve and bottom ﬁve countries to be about 30, but in the 1980 cross section the factor difference is close to
50.
5 Data on agriculture’s shares of employment and output for the United Kingdom and Canada are taken from
Mitchell (1992, 1993); those for the United States are taken from the US Department of Commerce’s (1975)
Historical Statistics of the United States, and from Kurian (1994) for more recent years. Estimates of real per
capita GDP are taken from Maddison (1995) and PWT 5.6.
6 Alston and Hatton (1991) actually suggest that the ratio of 2 for the United States is an artifact of regional
productivity differences and agriculture being concentrated in the South. They show that once one corrects for
non-cash payments to agricultural workers, there are no differences in agricultural and manufacturing wages
within US regions.834 D. Gollin et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 827–850
Fig. 6. Non-agricultural productivity relative to agricultural productivity—time series contrasted with 1990 cross
section.
movement of labor out of agriculture in developing countries? The rest of the paper
attempts to answer these questions.
3. Background
Recent efforts to account for international income differences within the neoclassical
growthmodelhaveexaminedthe consequencesofcross-countrydifferencesin government
policiesforsteady-stateincome.Two classes of policieshave beenstudied:those thatserve
to raise the cost of investment goods relative to consumption goods and those that serve to
decrease total factor productivity.7 A brief overview of these efforts is instructive for our
analysis.
The standard one-sector neoclassical growth model assumes a representative inﬁnitely




7 Empirical evidence suggests that both of these channels are relevant. Jones (1994) presents evidence that
the relative price of equipment is negatively correlated with GDP per capita, and Hall and Jones (1999) present
evidence that measured TFP is positively correlated with GDP per capita. See also Restuccia and Urrutia (2001)
and Collins and Williamson (1999) for evidence on the price of capital.D. Gollin et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 827–850 835
where 0 <β<1 is the discountfactor and Ct is consumptionin period t. The householdis
endowed with the economy’s initial capital stock, K0, and one unit of time in each period.







where γ is the rate of exogenous technological change and A is a TFP parameter that
summarizes the effects of government policies on a country’s output per unit of the
compositeinput.Feasibilityrequiresthat Ct +Xt  Yt ,w h e r eXt is investmentin periodt.
Capital evolves according to Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + Xt/π,w h e r eδ is the depreciation rate
and π  1 summarizes the effect of country-speciﬁc policies that increase the cost of
investment relative to consumption. Following this literature, we refer to π as the barrier
to capital accumulation.8
In assessing the consequences of differences in TFP or barriers to capital accumulation
for differencesin output, values for A and π can be normalizedto one for the US economy
without loss of generality. If another country has polices that yield TFP parameter A and
barrier π it is easy to show that steady state output of the United States relative to this
country is given by A−1/(1−θ)πθ/(1−θ).
This theory can generate large differences in output per capita given appropriate
combinations of values for A, π,a n dθ. A number of researchers (see e.g., Prescott, 1998;
Parente and Prescott, 2000)have arguedthat a valueof two thirdsfor the share parameter θ
is reasonable. This argumentis based on a broad interpretation of capital that encompasses
both tangible and intangible varieties. In what follows we adopt this parameterization and
interpretation of capital.
4. The neoclassical growth model with agriculture
In this section we extend the standard neoclassical growth model to explicitly
incorporate an agricultural sector, and ask whether it can account for the sectoral
development facts described previously if policy distortions are present. The numeraire
for this economy is the manufactured good.
4.1. Model economy
Instantaneous utility is now deﬁned over two consumption goods. To account for the
secular decline in agriculture’s share of economic activity we adopt a functional form for







8 While it is clearly important to understand how speciﬁc policies are mapped into A and π, we think this
reduced-form approach serves to better highlight the key elements of our subsequent analysis. As noted above,
we do not adhere to a literal interpretation of π as a policy distortion; the variable could equally well reﬂect a
variety of institutional differences across economies.836 D. Gollin et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 827–850
where φ is a preference parameter, at is consumption of the agricultural good, Ct is
consumption of the manufactured good, and a>0 is the subsistence term.9
The agricultural sector produces output (Yat) using capital (Kat) and labor (Nat) as







The manufacturing sector produces output (Ymt) using capital (Kmt) and labor (Nmt) as







As we note later in this section, the assumption of Cobb–Douglas production functions
has important substantive consequences for our analysis.11 In addition to being a natural
starting point for an analysis of this sort, this assumption is supported by empirical work.
(See, for example, the cross-country analysis of Hayami and Ruttan, 1985.)
Output from the manufacturing sector can be used for consumption or to augment the
two capital stocks. The manufacturing resource constraint is thus, Ct +Xmt +Xat  Ymt.
Output from the agriculture sector can only be used for consumption so the agriculture
resource constraint is simply at  Yat. Capital is sector-speciﬁc, so the laws of motion for
the two stocks of capital in the economy are:
Kmt+1 = (1−δ)Kmt +Xmt/πm, (4)
Kat+1 = (1−δ)Kat +Xat/πa. (5)
For simplicity we assume that both capital stocks depreciate at a common rate; this
restriction is not important to our ﬁndings. Given the sectoral patterns documented earlier,
it seems potentially important to allow for policies that may differ across sectors, so we do
allow policy to have differential effects on the accumulation of each capital stock through
sector speciﬁc barriers πa and πm.
The household is endowed with one unit of time in each period, which it allocates
between working in the manufacturing sector and working in the agricultural sector, and
with the economy’s initial capital stocks, Ka0 and Km0.
4.2. Quantitative ﬁndings
It is not necessary to calibrate the model to determine whether it can account for the
relative sectoral differences observed across countries. It cannot. The main problem is
that the model predicts that relative productivity is the same across countries regardless
9 Following a longstanding convention in the literature, we refer to the non-agricultural sector as the
manufacturing sector, although in our empirical work we will interpret this sector to include manufacturing
activity as well as other industrial activities and services.
10 We abstract from land as a ﬁxed factor in agriculture. Adding land to the model does not affect our main
quantitative ﬁndings.
11 Note that we assume here that exogenous technological change occurs at the same rate in the two sectors.
This assumption is motivated by the lack of any discernible trend in the relative price of agriculture to non-
agriculture goods in the United States over the last 100 years (see Kongsamut et al., 1997).D. Gollin et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 827–850 837
of policy differences reﬂected in TFP or barriers to capital accumulation.12 The reason
for this is as follows. Because labor is perfectly mobile between sectors, the agricultural
wage rate and the non-agricultural real wage rate are equal in equilibrium. As factors are
paid their marginal products, proﬁt maximization by ﬁrms in both sectors implies that
θa = waNa/paYa and θm = wmNm/pmYm.S i n c ewa = wm andcapital sharesarethe same








Policy distortions, therefore, have no effect on relative productivity. The straightforward
agricultural extension of the neo-classical growth model cannot account for the sectoral
relative productivity differences observed across countries.
The failure of the model suggests a number of possible alternative theories. One such
alternative in the spirit of Caselli and Coleman (2001) is to allow for factors that impede
the movement of labor from agriculture into manufacturing. Some countries do heavily
restrict movement out of rural areas. We do not follow this approach. Instead, we consider
an extension of the neoclassical growth model that allows for home production activities
that differ between rural and urban sectors.
As noted earlier, the assumption of Cobb–Douglas production functions is important to
this analytic result. This raises the issue of to what extent one could generate the observed
differences in relative productivities by having a different production function. Perhaps
not surprisingly, it is possible to account for some of the observed differences in relative
productivitiesbymovingtoadifferentspeciﬁcationoftechnologyintheagriculturalsector.
Intuitively, if a poor country has less capital and labor and capital are more substitutable
in agriculture than in non-agriculture, then as the amount of capital decreases the capital
to labor ratio may fall more in agriculture than in non-agriculture, thereby leading to a
lower average product of labor in agriculture. While we do not present the details here,
calculations that we performed showed that with an elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor in agriculture of two (rather than one for the case of Cobb–Douglas), we
could plausibly account for one half of the differences in relative productivities between
the richest and poorest countries given the observed differences in capital. We conclude
that theoretically there is scope for such an explanationto play a role, thoughas mentioned
earlier, empirical work supports the assumption of a unitary elasticity of substitution.
5. The model with agriculture and home production
In this section, we add a home production sector to the growth model with agriculture
and examine whether it can account for the US secular growth facts and the sectoral
development facts. The key feature of our abstraction is to allow for spatial heterogeneity
12 To examine whether the model can account for the sectoral transformation undergone by the rich countries,
one would need to calibrate the model. The performance of this model along this dimension is discussed in the
next section.838 D. Gollin et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 827–850
and have a rural region that is more conducive to home production opportunities than
the urban region. With no loss in generality, we focus on policy differences that lead
to differences in the cost of investment goods relative to consumption goods rather than
differencesinTFP.AsshownbyParenteandPrescott(2000),thereisaone-to-onemapping
from this type of distortion to TFP.
5.1. Model economy
The critical aspect of our formulation is that we incorporate spatial heterogeneity by
having an urban region and a rural region. Agriculture takes place exclusively in the
rural region, whereas manufacturing is assumed to take place exclusively in the urban
region.13 Individualsliving in both regionsare assumed to have access to home production
technologies that differ across regions.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that the economy is populated with a continuum
of identical inﬁnitely lived families, with each family consisting of a continuum of family
members. Families, rather than individual family members, own the economy’s capital.
This assumption buys us considerable simplicity since we do not have to keep track of the
heterogeneityin capital holdingsassociated with differencesin location. A family member
lives either in the rural area, in which case he divideshis time between the home sector and
the agricultural sector, or in the urban area, in which case he divides his time between the
home sector and the manufacturingsector. A family head makes all the family decisions—
howmanyfamilymembersliveineachregion,howtheyallocatetheirtimebetweenmarket
and home production, how much consumption each receives and how much capital to
accumulate. In keeping with the analysis of the previous section, we continue to assume
perfect mobility of individuals across locations.
For reasons of space, we describe only those aspects of the model economy that are
associated with the introductionof home productionand spatial heterogeneity.Preferences
are the same as before and given by Eq. (1). However, non-agricultureconsumption, Ct,i s









In (7), the parameter µ reﬂects the relative importance of the home and market non-
agriculture goods and the parameter ρ determines the elasticity of substitution between
home-producedand market-producedgoods.
With the introduction of home production, the capital endowment includes rural home
capital and urban home capital denoted by KR0,a n dKU0. Each individualfamily member
is still endowed with one unit of time each period. Individuals must divide their time
between market and home production in each period. For workers located in the rural
region this constraint is written nat + nRt = 1, while for workers located in the urban
region it is written nmt +nUt = 1.
13 Of course this is a stylization. In reality, a considerable amount of non-agricultural market production takes
place in rural areas. Moreover, urban agriculture (e.g., poultry and swine) may be important in some locations.
Nonetheless, the stylization is convenient here.D. Gollin et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 827–850 839
The technologies for the manufacturing and agricultural sectors are as before. With







where Kjt is capital, and Njt is hours in home production in region j = U,R.A n
importantfeatureofourspeciﬁcationis that we assume that homeproductionopportunities
are “better”in the ruralsector than in the urbansector. There are variouswaysthis couldbe
modeled; we choose to incorporate this feature by assuming that the two home production
technologies are identical except for a difference in TFP. Speciﬁcally, we assume that
AR >A U.14
Investment in home capital, like investment in market capital, requires forgoing
consumption of the manufactured good. The laws of motion for the home capital stocks
are:
KRt+1 = (1−δ)KRt +XRt, (9)
KUt+1 = (1−δ)KUt +XUt. (10)
As is apparent,homecapitalis assumed to depreciateat the same rate asmarket capital,but
the policy distortions do not affect home capital. Relaxing these assumptions do not have
a large impact on our ﬁndings, but in any case we view this as a reasonable benchmark.
The family head’s objective is to maximize the discounted value of average utility
across family members. Let λt denote the fraction of the representative family living






t ) denote the period utility























































14 Alternatives include assuming that the rural home production function is less capital intensive than the urban
home production function, or that there are complementarities in time inputs between agricultural activities and
home production, or that there are better substitution possibilities between home and market goods in rural areas.
For example, child care may be more easily supplied while working in rural areas than in urban areas, and
services such as food processing and distribution are accomplished via home production in rural areas, and via






wmtλtnmt +rmtKmt +(1−λt)watnAt +ratKAt
+(1−δ)(πmKmt +πaKat +KRt +KUt)

, (12)
nat +nRt = 1, (13)















given initial capital stocks.15 Equation (12) is the family’s intertemporalbudget constraint,
where Pt is the Arrow–Debreu date 0 price of the manufacturing good at date t.
Equations(13)and (14) are the time use constraintsof individualfamily membersliving in
the rural and urban regions. Equation (15) states that home consumption of rural family
members is less than or equal to the total home production produced in that region.
Equation (16) is the analogous constraint for the urban population.
In our abstraction there are two features that distinguish home production from
manufacturing sector output. First, capital can only be produced in the manufacturing
sector. One possible variation is to assume that home capital can be produced in the home
sector, though we have not explored it. Second, home produced output cannot be traded.
In some instances we think of this as a deﬁning characteristic of home production—e.g.,
child care is home produced only if the family provides it for itself. In other cases, this
assumption is probably not appropriate—for example, clothing made at home by family
membersin the ruralarea maybe sent to familymembers in the city. While ourassumption
is extreme, what is important for our results is that a signiﬁcant component of home
production cannot easily be transferred across regions.
5.2. Quantitative ﬁndings
In this section we examinethe quantitativepropertiesof the modelin orderto determine
whether it can account for the sectoral differences observed across countries and across
time within a given country. We proceed by ﬁrst restricting the model’s parameters so
that its equilibrium path over a 120-year period roughly matches the US economy’s path
over the 1870–1990period. For this parameterized economy, we then examine how policy
distortions affect the model’s predictions for differences across countries in aggregate
income and sectoral patterns of production.
5.2.1. Calibration
There are three aspects of the model that make the calibration procedure non-standard.
The ﬁrst is that capital is interpreted broadly to include intangible capital. Because
investments in intangible capital are not measured in the national accounts, there is
15 The fact that the family chooses the division of individuals between the urban and rural areas means that this
problem is not concave. However, it can still be shown that the solution to this problem is characterized by the
usual ﬁrst order conditions. See Rogerson (1984) for a proof in a similar context.D. Gollin et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 827–850 841
a discrepancy between output in the model and output in the National Income and Product
Accounts (NIPA). This necessitates that we adjust output in the model by the amount of
thisunmeasuredinvestmentinorderto makecomparisonswith theNIPAdata.(SeeParente
and Prescott, 2000 for an extended discussion.)
The second aspect of the model that makes the calibration non-standard is the
subsistence term in the utility function. This term implies that we can no longer view
the US economy as if it were on a constant growth path, as is the case in the one sector
version of the model described in Section 3. In this version, the economy will only
approach a constant growth path equilibrium as the effect of the subsistence term becomes
inﬁnitesimally small, or equivalently,as agriculture’s share of GDP approaches a constant.
In reality, this share has declined rather substantially over the postwar period, suggesting
that the postwar period should not be viewed as a constant growth path. In terms of the
calibration, this means that the parameter values must be restricted to match this decline.
It follows that we cannot assign the technology growth rate parameter γ to be the average
growth rate of US GDP per capita over the postwar period. However, we can still require
that the model match the growth rate of US GDP per capita over some interval. While this
match is not solely determined by the value of γ, it will be heavily inﬂuenced by it.
The third aspect that makes the calibration non-standard is home production. Home
production is unmeasured in the NIPA. The stock of household durables can be used as a
rough estimate for the total stock of home capital. However, there is no way to determine
how much of this is allocated between rural households and urban households. This lack
of measurement implies that it will not be possible to restrict all the values of the home
production preference and technology parameters with the use of data. Some assumptions
will have to be made to restrict a number of these parameter values. For this reason, the
calibration should be viewed as somewhat exploratory in nature.
The basic strategy of the calibration is to use observations from the US time series
to restrict all the preference and technology parameters not related to home production.
The one exception is the value of the capital share in manufacturing. For this we exploit
the estimate of intangible capital’s share from Parente and Prescott (2000). For the home
production parameters, our strategy is to use information on the stock of household
durables in the United States, market hours data for individuals outside of agriculture,
and estimates for the elasticity of substitution between market and home goods by Rupert
et al. (1995) and McGrattan et al. (1997).
The empirical counterparts of the model are as follows. Total (measured) investment in
market capital is the sum of residential and non-residential investment expenditures plus
25 percent of governmentexpenditures.The remaining part of governmentexpendituresis
consideredto be consumption.The value of agriculturaloutputis the value of outputof the
farm sector, and the value of (measured) nonagricultural output is GDP less the value of
farm output. The source of these statistics is the 1991 Economic Report of the President,
Tables B1, B8, and B32 and the US Commerce Department’s Historical Statistics of
the United States (1975), Series F 251. Agricultural capital is simply non-residential
farm capital. Measured non-agricultural physical capital is simply total capital minus
agriculturalcapital.ThesourceofthecapitalstockdataisMusgrave(1993,Tables2and4).
The empirical counterparts relevant for home production are the 1990 stock of household
durables,andthefractionofdiscretionarytimespentinmarketworkforindividualsoutside842 D. Gollin et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 827–850
the agricultural sector. We note that the empirical counterparts of the residences of both
farmers and non-farmersare included as part of the manufacturedcapital stock, rather than
as part of household capital.
A ﬁnal issue in the calibration is the choice of values for initial capital stocks. Rather
than attempt to obtain estimates of capital stocks for 1870, we choose these values so the
implied series for investment and sectoral labor shares do not display any abrupt changes
in the periods following 1870. Loosely speaking, the idea is to choose capital stocks for
1870that wouldbe consistent with the economybeing on a transitionpath that begansome
years earlier.16
Table 1 reports the parameter values and provides comments on how each value was
chosen. Note that γ = 0.0198, which is slightly lower than the 2 percent average growth
rate over 1960–1990 that we targeted in our calibration. This is because the growth rate
during this period is still slightly higher than its value on the constant growth path.
Nonetheless, the behavior of the calibrated model in the post World War II period is very
similar to a constant growth equilibrium; the capital to output ratios, the investment to
output ratio, and the growth rate of real GDP are all nearly constant. As a ﬁnal comment,
our procedure for allocating the two-thirds share for total capital in the nonagricultural
sector yields a split of 0.19 for tangible capital and 0.48 for intangible capital.17 This
implies that in 1990, investment in intangible capital is around one-half of measured GDP,
which is in line with the estimates suggested by Parente and Prescott (2000).18
5.2.2. Properties of the calibrated model
5.2.2.1. The United States, 1870–1990. At this stage, it is informative to examine some
ofthe longrunpropertiesofthe calibratedmodelandcomparethemwith theircounterparts
in the data. As we calibrate the model to reproduce the beginning and ending values for
agriculture’s share of GDP in the United States, we trivially match these observations.
However, with respect to the rate of decline in agriculture’s share of GDP, the model
matches the US experience reasonably well with the exception of some large swings about
trend in the 1890–1930period.
We did not explicitly calibrate to match agriculture’s share of employment, in either
1870or1990.Inthe UnitedStatesin 1870,agriculture’sshareof employmentis largerthan
its share of output. The calibrated model also displays this property, though the difference
is not as large as in the data. Speciﬁcally, the model predicts an employment share of
36 percent in 1870 versus the value of 48 percent found in the data (US Department of
Commerce, 1975).19 The 48 percent share found in the data most surely overestimates
agriculture’sshare of employmentin 1870 as there are a large number of part time workers
16 Given that our model is in discrete time, this procedure really only restricts initial capital stocks to lie in some
interval. However, since the different values in this interval do not have any effect on the equilibrium beyond a
few periods this does not appear to be a serious issue.
17 This split is relevant because of the need to do the GNP accounts excluding intangible investments.
18 Note that we assume intangible capital only in the manufacturing sector. We discuss the importance of this
later in the paper.
19 The calibrated non-home production model studied in Section 4 actually performs worse along this




θm Capital share in manufacturing 0.667 Based on estimates from Parente and Prescott (2000)
for market production with tangible and intangible
capital.
θa Capital share in agriculture 0.240 Consistent with 1990 agricultural capital stock and
output, and average annual rate of interest over
postwar period.
Am TFP in manufacturing 1.00 Normalization that only affects units in which output
is measured.
Aa TFP in agriculture 1.00 Normalization that only affects level of relative
prices.
πm Barrier in manufacturing 1.00 Normalization for same reasons above.
πa Barrier in agriculture 1.00 Normalization for same reasons above.
γ Exogenous rate of technological
change
0.198 Consistent with average annual growth rate of US
over postwar period of 2 percent
δ Depreciation rate 0.063 Consistent with 1990 investment and capital stock
data.
β Discount factor 0.960 Consistent with average annual interest rate of 6.5
percent over postwar period.
φ Expenditure share 0.003 1990 agriculture’s share of output of 2.3 percent.
¯ a Subsistence term 0.393 1870 agriculture’s share of output of 22 percent.
AR TFP in rural home production 1.00 Normalization that only affects units in which home
good is measured.
AU TFP in urban home production 0.900 Assumption that homeproduction in urban area is less
efﬁcient compared to rural area by 10 percent.
α Capital share in home production 0.110 Consistent with stock of household durables and
market work outside of agriculture in 1990.
µ Share parameter between market
and home goods
0.362 Consistent with stock of household durables and
market work outside of agriculture in 1990.
ρ Elasticity of substitution between
market and home goods
0.400 Based on micro estimates of Rupert et al. (1995) and
McGrattan et al. (1997) for United States.
in US agriculture, and these workers are not distinguished from full time workers in
constructing employment measures. In light of this, the discrepancy between the model
and the data along this dimension is not as bad as it appears.
Next we turn to the model’s predictions for the behavior of relative sectoral productiv-
ities and prices over time. The model predicts that the ratio of average labor productivity
in the two sectors is very nearly constant and equal to one. For the United States, this ratio
was roughly constant only after 1920 and closer to two. This is not particularly discon-
certing, since as documented earlier, the work by Alston and Hatton (1991) suggests that
the data overstate the true differences in 1920. For relative prices, the changes over the
120-year period are quite small. In particular, the relative price of agriculture in the model
is effectively constant, changing by roughly 1 percent over the 120-year period. This ac-
cords well with the data (see, e.g., Kongsamut et al., 1997). Additionally, the real rate of
return for the calibrated economy shows this same small decline, decreasing from 7.5 to
6.5 percent over the 120-year period.844 D. Gollin et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 827–850
The model has rich predictions for time allocations. Not surprisingly, given our
assumptions about home production possibilities, we ﬁnd that individuals in the rural
region devote more of their time to home production than do workers in the urban
region. More interesting, our model predicts a decline in the fraction of time that an
individualspendsin marketworkoverthe 120-yearperiod.Thedecline in the workweekin
manufacturingis more than 10 percent, and virtually all of it takes place between 1870 and
1960.Hence,this modelcan accountfor a large part ofthe secular declinein the workweek
inmanufacturing.Intheagriculturalsectorthedeclineisevenlarger:theworkweekfallsby
almost 25 percent. Coincident with this secular decrease in time devoted to market work,
there is a large movementof workers from the rural to the urban region.
5.2.2.2. Cross-country comparisons. How does the introduction of home production
possibilities affect the model’s predictions for sectoral differences across rich and poor
countries? We now use this model to examine the implications of distortionary policies on
the development process. To do this we contrast the behavior of our calibrated economy
with no distortions to another economy with barriers, πa  1a n dπm  1. As above, we
assume that initial capital stocks in the distorted economy are such that the equilibrium
paths for other variables display no abrupt changes over the 120-year period.
We have studied three cases. The ﬁrst assumes that the distortions apply equally to both
capital stocks and result in a fourfold increase in the cost of both types of capital relative
to the undistorted economy (i.e., πm = πa = 4). The second assumes that distortions only
applyto the manufacturingcapital stock (i.e., πm = 4, πa = 1). The third case assumes that
distortionsonly applyto the agriculturecapitalstock (i.e., πm = 1,πa = 4). Table 2 reports
our results. For expositional purposes, we report only the results from the benchmark
economy, (i.e., πm = πa = 1), and the case with πm = πa = 4. The reason for this is that
the results for the πm = 1a n dπa = 4 case are practically identical to the benchmark case,
and the results for the πm = 4a n dπa = 1 case are practically identical to the πm = πa = 4
case.
Table 2 reports NIPA GDP per capita, agriculture’s share of GDP, agriculture’s share
of employment, relative productivity,time allocated to agriculture work in the rural sector,
and time allocated to market work in the manufacturing sector at various dates across the
undistorted and distorted economies. We note that our measure of relative productivity is
chosen to correspond to the concept used in the data. Speciﬁcally, it looks at output per
worker and not output per unit of labor input. Additionally, we note that GDP is calculated
by using a geometric average of the 1990 price of agriculture in the two economies.
As the table shows, the model with home production generates differences in GDP per
capita as observed in the data. The difference in GDP per capita associated with a barrier
of 4 is approximately the factor 30 observed across the richest and poorest countries.
The model also predicts sizeable differences in the share of employment accounted
for by agriculture across rich and poor countries in 1990. In the undistorted economy,
agriculture’s share of employment is 5 percent in 1990, while in the distorted economy its
share is 63 percent. Third, the model generates large cross-country differences in sectoral
relative productivity. Relative productivity of the agricultural sector in the model is almost
six times larger in the undistorted economy than it is in the distorted economy in 1990.D. Gollin et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 827–850 845
Table 2
International comparisons
GDP paYa/GDP 1−λy m/ya na nm
π = 1 π = 4 π = 1 π = 4 π = 1 π =4 π = 1 π =4 π = 1 π =4 π = 1 π =4
1870 1.00 0.12 0.22 0.68 0.36 0.83 1.90 2.32 0.58 0.68 0.64 0.70
1900 1.92 0.14 0.13 0.49 0.22 0.74 2.03 2.97 0.52 0.42 0.60 0.51
1930 3.91 0.18 0.07 0.32 0.14 0.67 2.13 4.36 0.48 0.26 0.57 0.43
1960 7.31 0.27 0.04 0.19 0.08 0.63 2.20 7.36 0.46 0.16 0.55 0.40
1990 13.40 .41 0.02 0.12 0.05 0.63 2.26 12.90 .44 0.09 0.55 0.39
This is also very close to the difference between the richest and poorest countries in the
1990 cross section.
The reason the model generates these large differences in relative productivity is that
there are large differences in time allocations of rural workers in 1990 across the rich
(undistorted) and poor (distorted) economies. Rural workers in the poor economy are
working only about 20 percent as much in market activity as their counterparts in a rich
economy. Differences in time allocations in the urban region are much less pronounced.
This asymmetry between the distortions on rural and urban time allocations is due to the
asymmetry of home production opportunities across rural and urban regions.
As can be seen in the table, relative productivity differentials across distorted and
undistorted countriesincrease over time. This phenomenonis drivenby the secular change
in time allocations of workers in the two regions. In the distorted economy the secular
decline in the (market) workweek in the rural region is much larger than in the undistorted
economy. Initially, although the distorted economy has more workers in the rural region,
workers in the distorted economy have roughly the same time allocations as workers in the
undistorted economy. This is because the subsistence constraint is relatively binding. Over
time, this constraint eases and the time allocation in the rural area becomes increasingly
distorted toward home production. Although the table stops in 1990 it is worth noting
that the time allocation of rural workers to market production in subsequent years in
the distorted economy continues to show a decline, although at a slower rate than over
the 1870–1990 period. In the undistorted economy, in contrast, there is no subsequent
decline. As a result, the relative productivity differentials continue to widen. Moreover,
these differentials begin to reﬂect real output differences in agriculture.
The one dimension of the data on which the performance of the model is rather
disappointing is agriculture’s share of output across rich and poor countries. The
differences predicted by the model are small relative to what is found in the data. One
reason why the differences in agriculture’s share of output implied by the model are so
small is that individuals living in the rural region in the distorted economy allocate a small
fraction of their time to market activities. A second reason is that the relative price of
agricultureis lower in the poorercountry,by roughly80 percent. Alternative speciﬁcations
for preferences may give rise to smaller effects on relative prices and help the model on
this dimension. Accounting for the large difference in agriculture’s share of GDP across
rich and poor countries is a matter for future work.
A rather surprising result is that measured output in the distorted economy grows at
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that relative GDPs diverge for a long time. In fact, as the table documents, it is not until
roughly the end of the sample period that the distorted economy displays a growth rate of
real GDP that is roughly equal to the exogenous growth rate of technology. This pattern
is not generated in the other models studied in this paper. It is, however, the pattern
observed in the data. With the start of the Industrial Revolution in England, disparities
in living standards between the world’s rich and poor countries began to increase. These
disparities continued to increase until 1950. Our research shows that one does not need to
assume differential rates of exogenous technological change or poverty traps to account
for this pattern. Instead, a two-sector version of the neoclassical growth model with
home production, a broad concept of capital, and a subsistence term can qualitatively
generate this pattern. We conclude that this model may be very useful in accounting for
the divergence in international incomes from the Industrial Revolution to the latter half of
the twentieth century.
5.2.3. Sensitivity
One key featureof our abstractionis thatTFP is lower in urbanhomeproductionthan in
rural home production. In the numerical experiments, this was represented by a 10 percent
productivity gap in the two home production technologies. Given the arbitrary nature of
this parameterization, it is worthwhile to examine the sensitivity of the model’s results to
changesinthisparametervalue.We, therefore,consideralternativevaluesof0.85,0.95and
1.00 for AU. In each case we recalibrate the model as discussed previously and compute
the equilibriumpathfor120years. In theinterest of space we onlyreportstatistics for 1990
rather than the entire time series.
Table 3 presents the results. Several features are worth noting. Starting with the case
with no relative productivity differences, we observe that the model still predicts large
differences in income across the two economies. However, it no longer predicts large
differences in relative sectoral productivities between rich and poor countries. As AU is
decreased several patterns emerge. First, the difference in income per capita increases.
Second, the difference in the share of the population living in the rural area increases.
And third, the difference in relative sectoral productivities also increases. The table also
indicates that the difference in agriculture’s share of GDP also increases, but this effect
is fairly modest. The qualitative patterns in this table are intuitive given the mechanics of
the model discussed earlier. We conclude from this that the model predictions that we are
emphasizing require relatively small productivity differences.
Table 3
Sensitivity of results (1990 comparisons)
AU GDP paYa/GDP 1−λy m/ya na nm
π = 1 π = 4 π =1 π =4 π = 1 π = 4 π = 1 π =4 π = 1 π = 4 π = 1 π =4
0.85 13.30 .36 0.02 0.13 0.06 0.72 2.91 7 .50 .37 0.08 0.55 0.44
0.90 13.40 .41 0.02 0.12 0.05 0.63 2.31 2 .90 .44 0.09 0.55 0.39
0.95 13.20 .46 0.02 0.11 0.04 0.43 1.96 .50 .50 0.13 0.55 0.31
1.00 13.20 .53 0.02 0.11 0.04 0.19 1.61 .90 .55 0.27 0.55 0.25D. Gollin et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 827–850 847
A second issue noted earlier was our assumption that intangible capital is only relevant
in the manufacturing sector. This assumption is quantitatively signiﬁcant. As is well
known, the impact of a given barrier on cross-country income differences is increasing in
the capital share. Moreover, the impact of home production is increasing in the difference
between the capital share in the home sector and the market sector. We have also analyzed
a version of the modelin which we abstract from intangiblecapital completely and assume
a capital share of 0.30 in the manufacturing sector. Not surprisingly, in this case the factor
difference in aggregate output as of 1990 is 2.25 rather than 30, and the factor differences
in relative productivitiesis 1.7 rather than 5. Obviously, as is true in all models of this sort,
with a smaller capital share one needs larger distortions to match the differences found in
the data. The key point here is that we get a sizeable elasticity of relative productivities
with respect to changes in aggregate income even with the smaller capital share.
5.2.4. Welfare comparison
As discussed and analyzed in Parente et al. (2000), home production models imply that
differences in measured income across countries overstate the true differences in well-
being. For our calibrated model, we note that in 1990, the undistorted economy consumes
roughly 33 times more of the manufactured consumption good than does the distorted
economy, 1.1 times more of the agricultural good, but only about two-thirds as much
home produced output. In what follows we use our model to give a more precise measure
of actual welfare differences and contrast them to those obtained in the standard growth
model described in Section 3. We note that our measure is not affected by monotone
transformations of the utility function.20
Forthe standardgrowthmodel,we assume a parameterizationthat roughlyaccordswith
thevaluesusedinSection5.Thebarrierπ isselectedsothatthefactordifferenceinrelative
steady state incomes in this model equals the factor difference of 33 we obtained in our
benchmark speciﬁcation for 1990. Given a capital share equal to 2/3, the corresponding
value of π is 5.75. We compute the welfare gain associated with removing the barrier
for this economy as follows. First, we compute the equilibrium path that would result if
an economy beginning in the steady state corresponding to π = 5.75 were to eliminate
this barrier. Next, we compute the utility of the representative agent associated with this
equilibrium path. We then compute the utility of the representative agent if the economy
doesnot eliminate this barrierand it remainsin the steady state correspondingto π = 5.75.
We then determine the factor by which we would have to increase consumption in each
period under this second scenario in order that the resulting lifetime utility equal that
achieved when the barrier were removed. This factor increase in consumption is our
welfare measure.
The number we obtain is 2.8; i.e., if consumption were to be increased by a factor of
2.8 the individual would be indifferent about removing the barrier. Note that this number
is small in comparisonto the differencesin steady state consumptions.The ratio of the two
consumptions across the two steady states is 33—the same as the ratio of the two outputs.
The fact that our compensating differential is so much smaller than this factor indicates
20 Note that we have also assumed that there is unmeasured investment in the economy. This will not matter
for our welfare calculations since they are based on consumption ﬂows.848 D. Gollin et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 827–850
the importance of allowing for the accumulation of capital needed to reach the new steady
state.
We nowrepeatthiscalculationin the contextof ourtwo-sectorgrowthmodelwith home
production.Because there is no steady state for this economy,we take the 1990 allocations
in the distorted economy as our stating point in the exercise. In determining the factor by
whichconsumptionwouldhavetobeincreasedineachperiod,weassumethe consumption
of the home good, manufacturing good, and agricultural good of all family members is
increased proportionately. The number we obtain is 1.9, which is about two-thirds of the
number we obtained in the welfare calculation for standard model. We conclude from this
that while home production does diminish the welfare differences between rich and poor
countries for a given difference in measured output, the reduction is not particularly large.
6. Conclusion
Development economists have long noted the importance of agriculture in the share
of economic activity in poor countries. Contemporary researchers working with applied
general equilibrium models almost always abstract from sectoral issues. In this paper, we
introduced agriculture into the neoclassical growth model and examined the implications
for international incomes and sectoral patterns. We found that a straightforward extension
of the model fails to account for key sectoral differences observed across rich and poor
countries. This failure led us to consider an extension of the model that incorporates home
production. The key implication of this model is that distortions to capital accumulation
lead to a relative increase in the amount of unmeasured activity taking place in rural areas.
A reduction of the distortions leads to an efﬁciency-enhancing reallocation of inputs plus
an increase in measured economic activity. We found the model accounts for a number of
featuresof the sectoral transformationobservedin economicdata, both in the cross section
and the time series.
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